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UNITED STATES v. YIAN
905 E Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
United States District Court, Southern District of New York
I. FACTS
On October 5, 1994, a Grand Jury returned an
indictment against the defendant Chen De Yian, a
recent immigrant from China, for conspiracy to com-
mit interstate murder-for-hire and use of a firearm
during and in relation to a crime of violence. On
March 6, 1995, the government filed a superseding
indictment with three additional counts, including
conspiracy to attempt hostage-taking and hostage-
taking. Yian had already pled guilty under state law
for these additional crimes. In response to the su-
perseding indictment, he filed additional motions
on April 10, 1995 to dismiss the two hostage taking
counts on the grounds that the statute under which
he was charged, the Hostage Taking Act,I was un-
constitutional.
2
Congress enacted the Hostage Taking Act as
part of a three-bill package designed to combat
the rise of terrorism.3 Specifically, the Act imple-
mented the International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages ("Convention") which the
United Nations General Assembly adopted on
December 17, 1979, and the United States and
forty-five other countries signed on December 21,
1979. 4 The Act criminalized the seizing of hos-
118 U.S.C. § 1203 (1994). The Hostage Taking Act
provides in relevant part: (a) Except as provided in sub-
section (b) of this section, whoever, whether inside or
outside the United States, seizes or detains and threatens
to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain another person
in order to compel a third person or a governmental orga-
nization to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit
or implicit condition for the release of the person detained,
or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be punished by
imprisonment .... (b)(1) It is not an offense under this
section if the conduct required for the offense occurred
outside the United States unless-(A) the offender or the
person seized or detained is a national of the United States;
(B) the offender is found in the United States; or (C) the
governmental organization sought to be compelled is the
Government of the United States. (2) It is not an offense
under this section if the conduct required for the offense
occurred inside the United States, each alleged offender
and each person seized or detained are nationals of the
United States, and each alleged offender is found in the
United States, unless the governmental organization
sought to be compelled is the Government of the United
States.
tages only when the perpetrator or the victim was
not a United States national.5
Yian advanced three constitutional defects in the
Act. First, he alleged that the broad language of the
Act was not "necessary and proper for carrying into
[e]xecution" the Congress' treaty-making power
contained in Art. 1 § 8 of the Constitution because
it included conduct not essential to the implemen-
tation of the Convention. 6 The Convention was nar-
rowly targeted at combating international terrorism,
but the broadly worded Hostage Taking Act
criminalized hostage taking regardless of whether it
was pursuant to terrorism. Second, the Yian asserted
that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment 7 be-
cause the Act was not limited to conduct which
could be classified as interstate or international.
8
Finally, he argued the Act violated the Equal Pro-
tection guarantee inherent in the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause because it impermissibly im-
posed criminal liability based on alienage.9
II. HOLDING
The court found all three of Yian's contentions
unpersuasive. The court held that the Hostage Tak-
ingAct passed constitutional muster under the Nec-
2 See United States v. Yian, 905 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
3 Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 162.
4 Terrorism Taking of Hostages Convention Between
the United States of
America and Other Governments, Dec. 17, 1979,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,081, 1983 WL 144724 [hereinafter Con-
vention].
-118 U.S.C. § 1203.
6 Yian, 905 F Supp. at 163 n. 4 (citing U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, d. 10). The Necessary and Proper Clause states
in relevant part: "The Congress shall have Power... To
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof" 905 . Supp. at 163 n. 4.
'The Tenth Amendment reads, "The powers not del-
egated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States re-
spectively, or to the people" U.S. Const. amend. X.
8 Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 163.
9Id.
essary and Proper Clause because it was reasonably
related to carrying into execution the United States'
Treaty Power of Article 1, § 2 of the Constitution.'0
In addition, the district court held that the Act did
not violate the Tenth Amendment because a United
States treaty may override any state's power over
relations which usually fall within that state's con-
trol.I Finally, the court held the Act's alienage clas-
sification did not violate Equal Protection because
it reasonably furthered the legitimate government
interest of fighting international terrorism.'2
III. APPLICATION/ANALYSIS
A. NECESSARY AND PROPER
Citing M'Culloch v. Maryland, 13 the court ruled
that rational basis was the appropriate judicial stan-
dard for reviewing legislation allegedly in violation
of the Necessary and Proper Clause.' 4 Under this
deferential level of scrutiny, a court must find a stat-
ute "necessary and proper" so long as it bears a rea-
sonable relationship to carrying out a grant of power
to the federal government and is not otherwise pro-
hibited by law. 5 Therefore, even assuming that the
Convention was, as Yian asserted, "narrowly tar-
geted" at the problem of international terrorism, the
legislation which implemented the Convention had
to be only rationally related to fighting terrorism,
not narrowly-tailored to that end.' 6
The court went on to find that the Convention's
10 1d. at 165.
1id.
121d. at 168.
13M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). The
Court set out the rational basis test as follows: "Let the
end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the consti-
tution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited,
but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional." M'Culoch, 17 U.S. at 421.
14 Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 163.
'-905 E Supp. at 163. See also Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920). "If the treaty is valid there can be no
dispute about the validity of the statute under Article 1,
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the
powers of the Government." Holland, 252 US. at 432.
6 Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 163.
17905 F. Supp. at 163.
81Id. at'164. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (te)Et supra
note 1). The Hostage Taking Act tracks the Convention's
definition of hostage taking, including the specific exclu-
sion of domestic hostage taking when the hostage and the
alleged offender are nationals of the State in which the
offense occurred: "This Convention shall not apply where
purpose was not to combat "terrorism" in general,
but to tackle a discrete offense intimately associ-
ated with terrorism, namely, hostage taking. 17 In-
deed, the Convention's definition of hostage taking
made no reference whatsoever to "terrorism."' 8 Find-
ing that the Convention neither defined "terrorism"
nor included political or social motivation in its defi-
nition of hostage taking, the court concluded that
the Hostage Taking Act was reasonably related to
implementing the Convention.19 The court held that,
therefore, Congress had the power to implement




Yian's second objection to the Hostage Taking
Act was that Congress had exceeded its treaty-mak-
ing powers by reaching beyond matters of national
or international importance and usurping states' tra-
ditional power to establish the criminal law within
their borders.2' Yian cited dicta from the Supreme
Court in Missouri v. HoUand2 to support his con-
tention that Congress' power to implement treaties
was limited to matters of national or international
concern. 3 However, the court found no language in
Holland to support Yian's proposition.24 It noted,
rather, the Holland Court's observing that a federal
treaty may override a state's traditional power of
regulating relations within its jurisdiction.2 5 Al-
the offence is committed within a single State, the hos-
tage and the alleged offender are nationals of that State
and the alleged offender is found in the territory of that
State." Convention, supra note 4, at *4.
19 Yzan, 905 E Supp. at 164-65.
20905 F. Supp. at 162.2'Id. at 165.
2Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
23 Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 165. Specifically, Yian relied
on the following passage from Holland: "It is obvious that
there may be matter of the sharpest exigency for the na-
tional well being that an act of Congress could not deal
with but that a treaty followed by such an act could, and
it is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring
national action, a power which must belong to and some-
where reside in every civilized government is not to be
found." Holland, 252 U.S. at 433 (emphasis added) (in-
ternal quotations omitted).24 Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 165.
25The Holland Court stated, "Valid treaties of course
are as binding within the territorial limits of the States as
they are elsewhere throughout the dominion of the United
States. No doubt the great body of private relations usu-
ally fall within the control of the State, but a treaty may
though acts of Congress are the supreme law of the
land only when enacted pursuant to an enumerated
power under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitu-
tion, treaties take precedent when made under the
authority of the United States.26 This fundamental
difference between domestic legislation and inter-
national treaties has led to the contention that all
Tenth Amendment challenges to the Treaty Power
are structurally unsound. 27 In the words of one con-
stitutional law scholar:
Since the Treaty Power was delegated to the Federal
Government, whatever was within it was not re-
served to the States by the Tenth Amendment. Many
matters, then, may be 'reserved to the States' as re-
gards domestic legislation but not as regards inter-
national agreement. They are, one might say, left to
the States subject to defeasance if the United States
should decide to make a treaty about them.
28
Because the court lacked any precedent for Yian's
asserted limitation on the federal government's treaty
making powers, it held that the Hostage Taking Act
did not violate the Tenth Amendment.
C. EQUAL PROTECTION
The court also rejected Yian's contention that
the Hostage Taking Act violated the equal protec-
tion guarantee inherent in the Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. To resolve this issue, the court
had to make two determinations: whether the Act
discriminated on the basis of alienage, and if so, the
what the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny was.21
override its power." Holland, 252 U.S. at 434 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). See also Asakura v. City
of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332 (1924) (holding that a city ordi-
nance prohibiting the granting of pawnbroker's license to
aliens violated a treaty between the United States and
Japan and was unconstitutional under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution).
26Holland, 252 U.S. at 432.
27 Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 165 n.18.
28905 E Supp. at 165 n.18.
2id. at 166.
3 Id. This limitation did not apply if the United States
government was the party compelled to comply with a.
demand, such as a ransom note, in exchange for the re-
lease of a hostage. See 18 U.S.C. § 1203.
31 Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 166.
32905 F. Supp. at 166 (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S.
787, 792 (1977)).
331d. at 167. See also Plylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219
n. 19 (1982) (stating, "[w]ith respect to the actions of the
Federal Government, alienage classifications may be inti-
mately related to the conduct of foreign policy");
The Act criminalized a hostage taking only if one of
the offenders or one of the persons seized or de-
tained was not a United States national-i.e was an
"alien."30 As a result, the court held that the Hos-
tage Taking Act facially discriminated on the basis
of alienage.
3 1
In deciding what level of scrutiny to apply, the
court noted that the power of Congress to regulate
aliens within the nation's borders was more com-
plete than any other congressional power.3 2 As a re-
sult, the court found the appropriate standard of
review necessarily depended on whether the law was
passed by Congress or by the states.Y If Congress
had passed the law, the classification would survive
judicial scrutiny as long as it reasonably furthered a
legitimate government interest.34 The Supreme
Court in Mathews v. Diazs recognized that because
"decisions in [matters regarding the relationship
between the United States and its alien visitors] may
implicate our relations with foreign powers, and
since a wide variety of classifications must be de-
fined in the light of changing political and economic
circumstances," any rule of constitutional law that
would burden the government's response to such
changing global conditions "should be adopted only
with the greatest caution."36 Both the Second and
Ninth Circuits seized upon this dicta and surmised
that the Supreme Court adopted a standard of mini-
mal review when reviewing congressionally enacted
legislation whch classified on the basis of alienage
37
Applying a rational basis standard of review, the
court held that the alienage classification in the
Hostage Taking Act did not violate equal protection
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)
(stating that "any policy toward aliens is vitally and intri-
cately interwoven with contemporaneous policies in re-
gard to the conduct of foreign relations").
34Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 164-65.
3SMathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976). In Mathews,
resident aliens brought suit challenging the constitution-
ality of a Social Security Act provision that granted eligi-
bility for enrollment in the Medicare part B supplemen-
tal medical insurance program to resident citizens who
were 65 or older, but it denied eligibility to aliens unless
they had been admitted for permanent residence and had
resided in the United States for at least five years. The
Court held that this dassification by Congress did not
deprive aliens of liberty or property without due process
of law. Id.
36 Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81.
37 See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 76 (2d
Cir. 1984) (noting that "the [Supreme] Court has adopted
a stance of minimal scrutiny respecting federal regulations
that contain alienage-based dassifications"); United States
v. Lopez-Flores, 63 F.3d 1468, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1995)
because it reasonably furthered the legitimate gov-
ernment interest of fighting international terrorism.
38
IV. CONCLUSION
The Hostage Taking Act raises a number of is-
sues regarding federalism and equal protection. If
Congress had attempted to assert jurisdiction over
all acts of hostage taking, even those not covered by
the Convention, the resulting statute could violate
the Tenth Amendment. Unlike the federal kidnap-
ping statute39 which contains five readily identifi-
able jurisdictional elements, the Hostage Taking Act
contains no similar requirements for federal juris-
diction. It does, however, require that either the of-
fender or the victim to be a non-citizen of the United
States.40 Without this alienage classification, the Act
would extend to all acts of hostage taking, some of
which would contain no independent basis for Con-
gress to assert federal jurisdiction. The need to com-
ply with both the Convention and the Tenth Amend-
ment necessitated the use of alienage as a
jurisidictional element. Commenting on the Hos-
tage Taking Act, New York District Judge Sonia
Sotomayor eloquently wrote:
It is unfortunate that the federal government,
through its treaty power and in subsequent [en-
abling] legislation, saw fit to criminalize con-
duct specifically on the basis of the alienage of
the persons involved. It troubles this Court to
contemplate that its holding today might come
to be relied upon as authority in support of some
other provision or regime which, at bottom,
effects no sounder purpose than to discriminate
against persons on the basis of their alienage.
Nevertheless, this does not appear to be the
motivation behind the Hostage Taking Act. In
light of the deference afforded the federal gov-
emnment in connection with legislation passed
pursuant to its immigration and foreign policy
(holding, "Federal legislation that classifies on the basis of
alienage, enacted pursuant to Congress' immigration or
foreign policy powers, is therefore subject to the lowest
level of judicial review").
38 7an, 905 F. Supp. at 168.
39
18 U.S.C. § 1201 (1994).
4018 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(2) (1994).
"' United States v. Yi, 951 F. Supp. 42, 46 (S.D.N.Y.
1997).
42 Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting Four Drafts of Proposed Legislation to At-
tack the Pressing and Urgent Problem of International
powers, the Act must therefore be upheld as
constitutional.4'
Even assuming that the Act's underlying pur-
pose was not to discriminate on the basis of alienage,
the Act as applied by the United States Attorney's
Office in Chen De Yian's case still raises equal pro-
tection concerns. Contrary to the district court's
opinion, ample evidence in the legislative history of
the Hostage Taking Act and in case law discussing
the Act indicated both the executive and legislative
branches understood that the purpose of the Act
was to fight international or political terrorism. Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan, in his message transmitting the
proposed legislation to Congress, described its ulti-
mate aim: "To demonstrate to other governments
and international forums that the United States is
serious about its efforts to deal with international
terrorism, it is essential that the Congress provide
the necessary enabling legislation, so that we may
fully implement the Hostage-Taking Convention."4
Deputy Assistant Director Wayne R. Gilbert of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation further explained:
"The Hostage-Taking Act would extend our
jurisidiction and authority to act, where deemed
appropriate, on certain terrorist related hostage situ-
ations both within the United States and interna-
tionally."43 In United Sates v. Lopez-Flores, the Ninth
Circuit stated that"[s]trong foreign policy concerns
arising from the increased threat of in-country ter-
rorist attacks and the desire to meet the United
States' obligations under international treaties pro-
vided the impetus for passage of the Hostage Tak-
ing Act."44 In addition, the Yian court itself acknowl-
edged that the "foreign policy interest behind the
Hostage Taking Act [was] to attack the pressing and
urgent problem of international terrorism."45
Contrary to this understanding of the Act's pur-
pose, the U.S. Attorney's Office brought federal
charges against Chen De Yian for an intra-state, even
intra-city, domestic kidnapping incident that did not
Terrorism, H.R. Doc. No. 211, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 3
(1984).43Legislative Initiatives to Curb Domestic and Interna-
tional Terrorism: Hearings on S. 2626 Before the Subcomm.
on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1984).
44 United States v. Lopez-Flores, 63 F.3d 1468, 1473
(9th Cir. 1995).
45Yian, 905 F. Supp. at 168 (internal quotations omit-
ted).
have the slightest connection with international or
political terrorism. This system of concurrent fed-
eral and state criminal jurisdiction under the Act
allows multiple prosecutions for a single act of hos-
tage taking by aliens but not for United States na-
tionals. Perhaps United States District Court Judge
Kimba Wood said it best while describing the
alienage classification of the Hostage Taking Act:
"Although Congress's interest in combating inter-
national terrorism is dearly a legitimate government
purpose, care must be taken to ensure that this le-
gitimate purpose is not used as a springboard to dis-
criminate against aliens merely on the basis of
alienage."
46
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Edmund Chun
11 United States v. Song, 1995WL 736872, *5 (S.D.N.Y.
1995).
